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HUNTINGTON, NEW YORK'S SEX OFFENDER POLICY AND
THE INTRASTATE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
James Tierney
"The strictest law sometimes becomes the severest injustice."
Benjamin Franklin'
I. INTRODUCTION
Sex offenders are among the most loathed and detested mem-
bers of our society. Over the past fifteen years, communities have
zealously passed laws restricting the rights of sex offenders.2 These
laws mandate that sex offenders register with authorities and severely
limit where sex offenders may reside.3 This legislation is designed to
foster an important goal: to protect the health and safety of children
from possible recidivism from sex offenders.4 In 2007, the Town
Board of Huntington, New York, passed a law barring sex offenders
from renting or leasing accessory apartments within the Town.5 The
health and safety of the town's children is a compelling governmental
J.D. 2010 Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center.
1 Printquotes.info, Ben Franklin quotes, www.printquotes.info/quotes-by/benjamin-
franklin/l/ (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
2 See National Center for Missing & Exploited Children, Sex-Offenders: History,
http://www.missingkids.com/missingkids/servlet/PageServlet?LanguageCountry-enUS&P
ageld=3032 (last visited July 19, 2009).
Several federal laws mandate that states maintain a sex offender registry. Bureau of Jus-
tice Assistance, Overview and History of the Jacob Wetterling Act, http://www.ojp.usdoj.
gov/BJA/what/2aljwacthistory.html (last visited July 19, 2009) (outlining the applicable
federal statutes). See also Wendy Koch, States Restricting Where Sex Offenders Live, USA
TODAY, Feb. 26, 2007 at 1A (referring to a chart of state restrictions).
4 Grant Duwe et al., Does Residential Proximity Matter? A Geographic Analysis of Sex
Offense Recidivism, 35 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 484, 484 (2008).
5 Press Release, Town of Huntington, Precedent Setting Child Protection Legislation




Tierney: Sex Offender Policy
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2010
TOURO LA WREVIEW
interest. However, the Huntington statute is unconstitutional because
it is violative of the constitutional right to intrastate travel, as recog-
nized by the Second Circuit. 6 Deprivation of the right to travel out-
weighs the town's interest in protecting its children because the sta-
tute is not narrowly tailored to meet its public safety interest.
Huntington's accessory apartment statute is also poor public
policy because it will lead to the inverse of its stated intentions. The
statute is detrimental to the safety of children and will increase sex
offender recidivism by pushing sex offenders underground and away
from potential support systems. By enacting this statute, Huntington
has done more harm than good for not only the citizens of the Town
but for Suffolk County itself.8
Part II of this Comment provides a brief overview of the
Town of Huntington. Part III discusses the development of the right
to "intrastate" travel by first examining the fundamental right to "in-
terstate" travel. Part IV analyzes the Second Circuit's recognition of
a fundamental right to intrastate travel and whether this right exists in
Suffolk County. Part V studies the development of sex offender pol-
icy, including the development and constitutionality of residency re-
striction statutes. Part VI looks closely at New York's sex offender
policy, including the policy implemented in the Town of Huntington.
Part VII deciphers why the Town of Huntington targeted accessory
apartments, and whether the reasons for passing this statute contained
in their legislative intent are valid. Finally, this Comment will ex-
amine the constitutionality of Huntington's accessory apartment sta-
tute, regarding the right to intrastate travel, and whether Huntington's
sex offender policy, itself, is good for the general public welfare.
II. TOWN OF HUNTINGTON: OVERVIEW
The Town of Huntington is located on Long Island, in north-
western Suffolk County, New York, adjacent to the Nassau County
6 King v. New Rochelle Mun. Hous. Auth., 442 F.2d 646, 648 (2nd Cir. 1971) ("It would
be meaningless to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental precept of per-
sonal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitutional right to travel within a
state.").
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border. The Town has a population of approximately 206,952,9 and
encompasses an area of about ninety-three square miles.'o Along
with numerous villages and hamlets, eight school districts are located
in Huntington; five of which are entirely within the Town.' With the
amount of children attending schools within the town, it comes as no
surprise that the Huntington Town Board is very concerned with the
welfare of children. 12
III. THE INTERSTATE RIGHT TO TRAVEL
The right to intrastate travel developed from the constitutional
right to interstate travel.' 3 Although the word "travel" is not included
within the text of the United States Constitution, except in reference
to members of Congress,14 a fundamental right to travel was first
enumerated by the United States Supreme Court in Corfield v. Co-
ryell.15  The Supreme Court later recognized a fundamental right to
9 United States Census Bureau, Fact Sheet, Huntington Town, Suffolk County, New York
(2006-2008), http://factfinder.census.gov/ (search for "Huntington Town") (last visited Sept.
13, 2009).
1o Town of Huntington, About Us, http://town.huntington.ny.us/about toh.cfm (last vi-
sited Nov. 8, 2009).
" Id.
12 See Press Release, supra note 5.
" See Sarah E. Agudo, Irregular Passion: The Unconstitutionality and Inefficacy of Sex
Offender Residency Laws, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 307, 329 (2008) ("A reasonable reading of the
Constitution . . . suggest[s] that the Supreme Court will inevitably recognize the intrastate
right as a logical extension of the right to interstate travel."); Andrew C. Porter, Toward a
Constitutional Analysis of the Right to Intrastate Travel, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 820, 842 (1992)
("If a fundamental constitutional right to travel exists, then there is no reason to read the
right as inapplicable to intrastate travel.").
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. Some believe that the right to interstate travel was so in-
herent that the Founders thought that it was not necessary to be included in the text of the
Bill of Rights. ZECHARIAH CHAFFEE, JR., THREE HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE CONSTITUTION OF
1787 185 (1956) ("[T]hey wanted to keep the provision operative, but considered that its
substance was embodied elsewhere and left it out as superfluous."). Another reason for the
non-inclusion of the word "travel" in the Constitution is that its protection is subsumed with-
in other protections of it; it is "firmly embedded in our jurisprudence." Saenz v. Roe, 526
U.S. 489, 498 (1999) (citing United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966)).
" 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3,230) (concluding that the Privileges and
Immunities Clause extends to include "[t]he right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or
to reside in any other state" is among "the particular privileges and immunities of citizens"
that are "deemed . .. fundamental."). See also Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492
(1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he various provisions in the Constitution ... all prove
that it intended to secure the freest intercourse between the citizens of the different States...
. [A]ll citizens of the United States . .. must have the right to pass and repass through every
part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.").
3
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interstate travel in Crandall v. Nevada.16 Relying upon Chief Justice
Taney's dissent from The Passenger Cases,'7 the Court found that a
tax on every person leaving a state by " [']railroad, stagecoach, or
other vehicle engaged or employed in the business of transporting
passengers for hire[']"' 8 was unconstitutional because it would hinder
transportation in and out of the country.' 9 After rendering a similar
decision three years later in Ward v. Maryland,20 the Court allowed
the interstate travel doctrine to lay dormant for nearly seventy-five
years until Edwards v. Calfornia.2 1 In Edwards, the Court found that
a California statute, which made it a crime to transport an indigent
person into the state, violated the constitutional right to travel.22 The
majority of the justices derived this right from the Commerce
Clause,23 holding that the clause extended to the "transportation of
persons[,]" and prohibited states from "shutting its gates to the out-
side world." 24 Although Edwards recognized the right to travel, it
was not recognized as a fundamental right until 1966, in United
States v. Guest.25
Three years after Guest, the Court, in Shapiro v. Thompson,26
invoked the right to interstate travel to invalidate statutes that im-
posed priorities on this right. Several states had statutory provisions
denying welfare assistance to residents who had not resided in their
jurisdiction for at least one year.27 After examining the statutes, the
Court concluded that the right to interstate travel was grounded in the
" 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 49 (1867).
1 Id. ("Although these remarks are found in a dissenting opinion, they do not relate to the
matter on which the dissent was founded. They accord with the inferences which we have
already drawn from the Constitution itself, and from the decisions of this court in exposition
of that instrument.").
SId. at 35.
19 Id. at 46.
20 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418 (1870) (holding that a Maryland statute requiring non-residents
to obtain a license before selling merchandise made outside of the state violated the constitu-
tional right to travel).
21 314 U.S. 160, 178 (1941).
22 Id. at 177.
23 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
24 Edwards, 314 U.S. at 173.
25 Guest, 383 U.S. at 757 (1966) ("The constitutional right to travel from one State to
another . . . occupies a position fundamental to the concept of our Federal Union. It is a
right that has been firmly established and repeatedly recognized.").
26 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
27 Id. at 622-26.
148 [Vol. 26
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Constitution, but declined to find a particular source of this right.28
The Court concluded that "any classification which serves to penalize
the exercise of that right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional." 29 The Court
also distinguished between the terms "residence" and "duration of
residence."3 o While "residence" is defined as an intent to remain in a
jurisdiction, "duration of residence" is an intent to remain in a juris-
diction for a certain period of time. 3 1 However, the Court left open
the possibility that some durational residency requirements may be
upheld.32 Thus, the scope of interstate travel became less clear after
Shapiro, as the Supreme Court has either struck down or upheld vari-
ous residency requirements.33
The Supreme Court's last decision regarding the right to in-
terstate travel was in Saenz v. Roe in 1999.34 In Saenz, three new
California residents challenged the constitutionality of a state statute
limiting the amount of welfare benefits available to a family that had
resided within the state for less than one year.35 In its decision, the
Court recognized three components of a right to travel. 36 First, "[i]t
28 Id. at 629-30.
29 Id. at 634.
30 Id. at 636 n.16.
31 Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 636 n.16.
32 Id. at 638 n.21.
We imply no view of the validity of waiting-period or residence re-
quirements determining eligibility to vote, eligibility for tuition-free
education, to obtain a license to practice a profession, to hunt or fish, and
so forth. Such requirements may promote compelling state interests on
the one hand, or, on the other, may not be penalties upon the exercise of
the constitutional right of interstate travel.
Id.
33 See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972) (striking down a statute requiring a one-
year residency in the state and a three-month county residence as prerequisites for voter reg-
istration). However, the Court recognized that a durational residency requirement would be
valid if precisely drawn and the state does not "choose means that unnecessarily burden or
restrict constitutionally protected activity." Id. at 343. See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S.
393, 393, 406 (1975) (using rational basis to uphold a one-year residency requirement in or-
der to obtain a divorce, stating that the "divorce residency requirement is of a different
stripe[,]" and the plaintiff was not "irretrievably foreclosed" from obtaining a divorce, and
that she would eventually qualify to obtain one, albeit with a delay); N.Y. Att'y Gen. v. So-
to-Lopez, 476 U.S. 898, 911 (1986) (using strict scrutiny in finding a state statute unconsti-
tutional which granted extra points on civil service exams to veterans who were New York
state residents at the time of military service).
34 526 U.S. 498 (1999).
" Id. at 492, 493 -94.
36 Id. at 500.
5
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protects the right of a citizen of one State to enter and to leave anoth-
er State."37 Second, the right to travel protects "the right to be treated
as a welcome visitor rather than an unfriendly alien when temporarily
present in the second State." 38 Third, the right protects "those travel-
ers who elect to become permanent residents, [by granting them] the
right to be treated like other citizens of that State."39 The Court
found that this component is protected by the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 40 Although the reasoning
in Shapiro differs from Saenz, the application of strict scrutiny to the
fundamental right to travel is similar.4 1 Therefore, the Court found
the statute unconstitutional.42
Despite the murkiness and confusion surrounding the inter-
state travel doctrine, it has been universally accepted as a constitu-
tional right.43 On the other hand, it is unknown whether the right to
intrastate travel exists.4 4 It is hard to believe that one's right to travel
from New York to New Jersey is protected by the Constitution, but
the right to travel within the Town of Huntington is not. Although
intrastate travel should be a constitutional right, the Supreme Court
has purposefully declined to so decide. If the Court establishes the
constitutional right to intrastate travel, then the Huntington statute is
unconstitutional because of its extreme effects on traveling within the
Town of Huntington.
IV. INTRASTATE TRAVEL
A. The Supreme Court
The first mention of any right to intrastate travel was in Chief
37 Id.
38 Id
3 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 500.
40 Id. at 502-03.
41 See Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Reviv-
al Portend the Future-or Reveal the Structure of the Present?, 113 HARV. L. REV. 110, 124
(1999).
42 Saenz, 526 U.S. at 505 (finding that California's statute placed a "penalty" on interstate
travel).
43 MARCUS NIETO & DAVID JUNG, THE IMPACT OF RESIDENCY RESTRICTIONS ON SEX
OFFENDERS AND CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT PRACTICES: A LITERATURE REVIEW 15
(2006), available at http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/06/08/06-008.pdf.
4 See id. at 8.
150 [Vol. 26
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Justice Taney's dissent in The Passenger Cases.45 Although it is
clear that the Chief Justice was discussing interstate travel, the phrase
"as in our own States" 46 may have been the first statement by a Unit-
ed States Supreme Court Justice on the right to intrastate travel-
albeit indirectly. The Supreme Court mentioned a right to intrastate
travel in dicta of two early twentieth-century cases. 47  The Court,
however, failing to address the issue in multiple cases, has not de-
cided whether the right to intrastate travel is considered a fundamen-
tal right.48 Therefore, it has been left up to the circuit courts to de-
termine whether a fundamental right to intrastate travel exists.
B. King v. New Rochelle Housing Authority
In 1971, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals first recognized
the right to intrastate travel in King v. New Rochelle Municipal Hous-
ing Authority.49 The plaintiffs in King were residents of New Ro-
chelle who had requested applications for public housing from the
defendant.5 0 These requests were either refused or denied because of
a five-year durational residency requirement statute enacted by the
housing authority.5 ' The plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of
the statute based on the right to interstate travel and the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.52 The court held that the residency restriction was a pe-
nalty "imposed solely because they [had] recently exercised their
4' 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting) (remarking that every Unit-
ed States citizen has the right to freely enter and exit states "without interruption, as freely as
in our own States").
46 id
47 See Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900) ("[T]he right of locomotion, the right
to remove from one place to another according to inclination . . . [the right] of free transit
from or through the territory of any state is a right secured by the 14th Amendment . . . .");
United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 293 (1920) ("[State citizens] possessed the funda-
mental right, inherent in citizens of all free governments, peacefully to dwell within the lim-
its of their respective states, to move at will from place to place therein, and to have free in-
gress thereto and egress therefrom . . . .").
48 See Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa, 415 U.S. 250, 255-56 (1974); Chicago v. Morales,
527 U.S. 41, 53 n.19, 55 (1999).
49 442 F.2d 646 (2d Cir. 1971).
'o Id. at 647.
5' Id. At the time of the case, the housing authority had an insufficient amount of public
housing for the residents of New Rochelle, and because of this, persons with accepted appli-
cations were on a three to ten year waiting list; therefore, persons who were not eligible due
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right to travel."
The court further concluded that "[i]t would be meaningless
to describe the right to travel between states as a fundamental precept
of personal liberty and not to acknowledge a correlative constitution-
al right to travel within a state."54 The Second Circuit recognized the
right to intrastate travel and reviewed the New Rochelle statute under
strict scrutiny.55 The Second Circuit held that there was no compel-
ling governmental interest in deterring the right to intrastate travel.56
It reasoned that a state's interest in favoring its long-term residents
over short-term residents was not a compelling interest, and a com-
munity taking care of its own first is not a constitutionally viable rea-
son for deterring the right to intrastate travel. Because the Second
Circuit recognizes the right to intrastate travel, the Huntington statute
will be judicially reviewed under strict scrutiny. Although the state
has a great interest in protecting the welfare of its children, the Town
statute fails to survive strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tai-
lored to meet this interest.
V. HISTORY OF SEX OFFENDER STATUTES
The first sex offender restrictions were set in California in
1947.58 Three years later, California began to keep track of sex of-
fenders through fingerprints and photos.59 Very few states passed sex
offender restriction laws before 1990.60 The first sex offender com-
munity notification act was enacted in Washington in 1990, after a
seven-year-old boy was raped, stabbed, and mutilated by a man with
a long history of sexual violence. 6' This act was not only intended to
King, 442 F.2d at 648.
54 id
51Id. at 647-48.
56 Id. at 649.
57 Id.
See Office of the Att'y Gen., Megan's Law: Sex Offender Registration and Exclusion
Information, http://www.meganslaw.ca.gov/sexreg.aspx?lang=ENGL- ISH (last visited Sept.
16, 2009).
5 NIETO & JUNG, supra note 43, at 7.
60 Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Illinois, Montana, Nevada, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
Utah were the only states to enact sex offender residency statutes before 1990. See ScoTT
MATSON & ROXANNE LIEB, WASH. ST. INST. PUB. PoL'Y, SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION: A
REVIEW OF STATE LAWS 13-19 (1996).
61 Christine Willmsen, Dangerous Sex Felons: Address Unknown, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec.
11, 2005, at Al.
152 [Vol. 26
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enable agencies to monitor sex offenders, but to also notify the com-
munity that a sex offender resides in their area.62 A 1996 study of
this registry concluded that although the act has helped to educate the
community about sex offenders, there has been no reduction in the
amount of sex crimes against children.63
A. The Jacob Wetterling Act
On October 22, 1989, Jacob Wetterling was abducted by a
masked gunman while riding his bicycle.64 Neither Jacob nor the
gunman has been seen since.65 This event inspired the passing of the
Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Of-
fender Registration Program (hereinafter "Jacob Wetterling Act").66
The Act requires all sex offenders to register with state law enforce-
ment, and disclose their permanent residence.67 Compliance was
made mandatory; if a state should refuse to comply, the result would
be a ten percent loss of federal funding for state and local law en-
forcement.6 8 In order to legally register, sex offenders must give lo-
cal officials their current addresses, telephone numbers, social securi-
ty numbers, names and addresses of employers, and, often,
fingerprints, a photograph, and DNA samples.69
B. Megan's Law
In 1994, Megan Kanka, a seven-year-old girl in New Jersey,
was raped and murdered by a neighbor who was previously convicted
of sexually assaulting two young girls. 70 Due to extreme community
pressure, Congress passed a law in 1996, which became known as
Megan's Law, which permits states to "release relevant information"
62 Id.
63 See NIETO & JUNG, supra note 43, at 10.
64 Richard Meryhew, Wetterling Agency Changes Name to Better Reflect its Work, STAR
TRIBUNE, Sept. 22, 2008, at 2B.
65 Id.
66 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071 (West 2006).
67 42 U.S.C.A. § 1407 1(a)(1)(A)-(B).
68 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(g)(2)(A).
69 Amber Leigh Bagley, "An Era of Human Zoning": Banishing Sex Offenders from
Communities Through Residence and Work Restrictions, 57 EMORY L.J. 1347, 1351 (2008).
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pertaining to sex offenders who are required to register "to protect
the public."" All fifty states have passed a version of Megan's
Law,72 and the Supreme Court has routinely upheld the public disclo-
sure of sex offender registries as constitutional.73 Since the passing
of Megan's Law, the Jacob Wetterling Act has been amended to in-
clude other restrictions against sex offenders.74 In the same year that
Megan's Law passed, the Jacob Wetterling Act was amended by the
Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking and Identification Act of
1996," the Campus Sex Crimes Prevention Act,76 and the Adam
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act.
C. Residency Restriction Statutes
The first sex offender residency restriction law was passed in
Alabama in 1996.78 By 2005, fourteen states had adopted residency
restrictions similar to Alabama's. 79 Many of the state sex offender
residency restrictions are known as "Jessica's Laws," due to the trag-
7' 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(e)(2).
72 Bagley, supra note 69, at 1352.
7 See Conn. Dep't Pub. Safety v. Doe, 538 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (reversing the lower court's
injunction that prevented public disclosure of Connecticut's sex offender registry); Smith v.
Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 105-06 (2003) (holding Alaska's version of Megan's Law to be constitu-
tional).
74 See Sex Offender Registration: Policy Overview and Comprehensive Practices (Oct.
1999), http://www.csom.org/pubs/sexreg.html; see also Overview and History of the Jacob
Wetterling Act, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/what/2aljwacthistory.html (last visited July
21, 2009).
7 42 U.S.C.A. § 14072(b) (West 2006) (establishing a national database of sex offenders
to assist state and local law enforcement in tracking sex offenders released from prison).
76 42 U.S.C.A. § 14071(j) (requiring sex offenders attending educational institutions, or
working or volunteering on campus to provide notice of their status to the institution).
n Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat.
587 (2006) (expanding the power of the Jacob Wetterling Act by lowering the age of juve-
niles who must register as sex offenders, expanding the definition of a sex offense, and leng-
thening registration and notification periods); see also Caitlin Young, Children Sex Offend-
ers: How the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act Hurts the Same Children it is
Trying to Protect, 34 NEW. ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 459, 460 (2008).
78 ALA. CODE § 15-20-26 (2009) (stating that sex offenders living in Alabama cannot es-
tablish a residence or be employed within: (i) 2,000 feet from any school or day care center;
or (ii) 1000 feet of the residence of any of his or her former victims or their immediate fami-
ly members).
7 Jeffrey T. Walker, Eliminate Residency Restrictions for Sex Offenders, 6 CRIMINOLOGY
& PUB. POL'Y 863, 864 (2007), available at http://www.ccoso.org/library%20articles/Elim-
inate%20Residency/o20Restricitons%20for/2OSex%200ffenders.pdf.
10
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ic death of Jessica Lunsford.8 0 Jessica was a nine-year-old girl who
was abducted from her home, raped, and buried alive by a next-door
neighbor who had previously been convicted twice of molesting
children.8 1 As a result of this, many states either passed new residen-
cy restrictions or expanded old restrictions.82 In all, twenty-seven
states have enacted state-wide sex offender residency restrictions-
including New York.8 ' Almost all of the residency restrictions bar
sex offenders from living within a certain distance from schools or
child care facilities. Huntington's statute goes even further by bar-
ring sex offenders from owning or leasing a certain type of housing,
regardless of the distance from a school or child care facility.84 The
Town's statute acts as a more restrictive supplement to the currently-
enacted state restriction. Although all of these laws are bad public
policy, resulting in more harm than good for the safety of children,
sex offender residency restrictions are constitutional according to the
Eighth Circuit.
1. Doe v. Miller and the Fundamental Right to
Travel
The first constitutional challenge of sex offender residency
restrictions that invoked the constitutional right to travel occurred in
the Eighth Circuit, in Doe v. Miller.86 In 2002, Iowa passed a resi-
dency restriction preventing sex offenders from residing within 2000
feet of a school or registered child care facility." Almost immediate-
ly after the law took effect, three sex offenders filed suit, asserting
that the residency restriction was unconstitutional on its face because
the statute left only limited areas within the state where they could
80 Wendy Koch, Sex-Offender Residency Laws Get Second Look, U.S.A. TODAY, Feb. 26,
2007, at Al.
81 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, No EASY ANSWERS: SEX OFFENDER LAWS IN THE UNITED
STATES 2 (2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/us0907web
wcover.pdf.
82 Koch, supra note 80, at Al.
83 Id. (stating that New York bars serious offenders from entering school grounds or child
care facilities).
84 See Press Release, supra note 5.
85 Doe v. Miller (Miller II), 405 F.3d 700, 704-05 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S.
1034 (2005).
86 Id. at 709, 711-12.
87 IOWA CODE ANN § 692A.2A (West 2008).
2010] 155
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possibly live." The district court found that the restrictions pre-
vented sex offenders from living in over seventy-five percent of Car-
roll County, Iowa, and the areas that remained consisted of mostly
inhabitable farmhouses. 89 The district court concluded that the Iowa
statute was unconstitutional on several grounds, including infringe-
ment upon the "fundamental rights to travel." 90 By stating "rights"
instead of "right," it can be said that the district court recognized both
interstate and intrastate right to travel. Reviewing the statute under
strict scrutiny, the district court held that the statute was not narrowly
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.9'
However, the Eighth Circuit reversed the lower court's hold-
ing and declared that the Iowa statute was constitutional.92 The court
found that the statute did not interfere with the intrastate right to tra-
vel and declined to decide whether there is a fundamental right to in-
trastate travel. However, the court did state that "assuming such a
right is recognized, it would not require strict scrutiny[J" 94 and such
a right would be "'correlative' to the right to interstate travel."9 Ac-
cording to the court, the residency restriction statute did not prevent
sex offenders from entering and leaving Iowa, and "[did] not erect
any actual barrier to intrastate movement." 96 The court reasoned that,
since sex offenders are not prevented from maintaining employment
or conducting commercial transactions, the Iowa statute does not
"expel" sex offenders from communities-it just restricts their ability
to establish a residence.9 7 Since the court did not find a fundamental
right implicated, it reviewed the statute under a rational basis test and
concluded that promoting the safety of children was a legitimate state
interest, thereby finding the Iowa statute constitutional.98
88 Miller II, 405 F.3d at 705.
89 Doe v. Miller (Miller 1), 298 F. Supp. 2d 844, 852 (S.D. Iowa 2004).
90 Miller II, 405 F.3d at 708.
91 Miller I, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 876.
92 Miller II, 405 F.3d at 723.
Id. at 713.
94 id.
9s Id. (internal quotation omitted).
96 Id.
9 Miller II, 405 F.3d at 719.
8 Id. at 714.
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2. Comparing and Contrasting Miller and King
There seems to be a clear difference between the interpreta-
tion of "intrastate travel" applied in Miller and King.99 In recogniz-
ing a fundamental right to intrastate travel, the Second Circuit deter-
mined that durational requirements for public housing made it
impossible for a person to find housing in a municipality, thereby
equating intrastate travel to the right to live where one wants. 00 In
contrast to King, the Eighth Circuit defined the intrastate right to tra-
vel as freedom of movement within a state, not necessarily the ability
to reside in a state.10' Only 2.7% of the remaining units were habita-
ble in the county in question in Miller.102 It is true in both circums-
tances that neither the plaintiffs in King nor Miller were completely
barred from living in their respective areas.' 03  There was a very
small percentage of housing available for sex offenders in Carroll
County, and residents in New Rochelle could have put their names on
the housing waiting list after residing in New Rochelle for a period of
time. 104 Plaintiffs in both cases could have sought housing elsewhere
in their respective states. 05  Additionally, perhaps both plaintiffs
could have sought accessory apartment housing within their area.
For example, the plaintiffs in Miller could have sought vacant farm-
houses in larger farms or searched for accessory apartments outside
the restricted area in Carroll County.106 The plaintiffs in King already
had housing in New Rochelle and could have realistically stayed
99 Compare King, 442 F.2d at 648 (recognizing that a statute that infringed the right to
intrastate travel must be reviewed under strict scrutiny), with Miller II, 405 F.3d at 723
(holding that even if there is a fundamental right to intrastate travel, it would not require
strict scrutiny).
"0 King, 442 F.2d at 648 (holding that the durational residency requirement was a penalty
solely because the plaintiffs exercised their right to travel by trying to find housing in New
Rochelle.).
1o1 Miller H1, 405 F.3d at 714 (finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove any argument that
"the right to 'live where you want' is 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion.' ").
102 See Miller 1, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (finding that 244 of the 9019 residential units in
Carroll County, Iowa, were habitable and located in places not within the restricted area).
103 Id. at 853-54, 856, 857, 858; see also King, 442 F.2d at 647.
104 id
"o See Miller II, 405 F.3d at 706 (noting that while the areas within city limits where sex
offenders could establish residences was limited, such areas do exist); King, 442 F.2d at 647
(noting that all plaintiffs/respondents had established private residences in New Rochelle).
106 See Miller II, 405 F.3d at 706.
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there until eligibility.1 o7  If possible, they could have also sought
cheaper accessory apartments in New Rochelle. However, "seeking"
and "finding" are two different concepts. Although a resident of
New Rochelle may have the ability to seek some type of living space
within the town, such as an accessory apartment, he is not guaranteed
that one will be found. Considering the extremely long waiting pe-
riod for public housing in New Rochelle, 0 8 finding other housing
would be next to impossible. Although the statute is not a complete
bar to living in New Rochelle, it does not make it any less unfair.
It can be argued that the statutes in question did not complete-
ly bar sex offenders from living within their respective areas. There-
fore, the fundamental difference between the King and Miller courts
is the degree of burden that a statute impinges on the right to intras-
tate travel in order for it to be held unconstitutional.'09 While the
court in King believed that a substantial impairment on the right to
intrastate travel warranted the application of strict scrutiny, t ' the
Miller court believed that, unless the right to intrastate travel was
completely impaired, strict scrutiny was not justified.'" Based on
this difference, it is likely that the Second Circuit may rule differently
than the Eighth Circuit regarding the Iowa sex offender statute.
Moreover, since the residency restriction prevented sex offenders
from living in over ninety-eight percent of the county," 2 it might be
said that the restriction caused a substantial impairment on the right
to intrastate travel."' 3  Most likely, the Second Circuit would have
concurred with the Iowa district courtl 4 and ruled the statute uncons-
107 King, 442 F.2d at 647.
108 See id. (stating that new residents who have not resided in New Rochelle for a mini-
mum of five years may have to wait eight to fifteen years for public housing).
'" See King, 442 F.2d at 648 (holding that the New Rochelle statute was unconstitutional
since it penalized new residents for exercising their right to intrastate travel); Miller II, 405
F.3d at 705, 713 (holding that the Iowa statute was constitutional since it did not prohibit sex
offenders' right to intrastate travel).
110 See King, 442 F.2d at 648.
..' See Miller II, 405 F.3d at 713.
112 Miller I, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 852 (stating that "barely two percent of housing is availa-
ble" to registered sex offenders).
"3 See Agudo, supra note 13, at 330 (stating that the Iowa statute restricts "where a per-
son may live, especially in an expansive manner that virtually forbids residence in all urban
areas, inhibits travel significantly"); Peter D. Edgerton, Banishment and the Right to Live
Where You Want, 74 U. CHI. L. REv. 1023, 1046 (2007) (comparing sex offender residency
restrictions to "felon disenfranchisement").
114 Miller I, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 875 (finding that the Iowa Code § 692A.2A infringes on
sex offenders' rights to both interstate and intrastate travel).
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titutional. It can also be argued that the Second Circuit would hold
the Huntington accessory apartment statute unconstitutional because
barring sex offenders from owning or leasing accessory apartments
results in a substantial impairment on the right to intrastate travel.
VI. HUNTINGTON TowN CODE
Besides the already-implemented New York statute, Suffolk
County has enacted its own sex offender residency restrictions. 115 In
2007, Huntington enacted its own sex offender residency restriction
statute.'1 6 Although both statutes have the same quarter-mile restric-
tion on sex offender residences, more areas are restricted under the
Huntington statute than the New York statute. "7 In addition to the
residency restriction, Huntington enacted the following restriction
pertaining to sex offenders:
It shall be unlawful for a property owner or person in
charge of property to knowingly or recklessly lease or
sublease his property to a registered sex offender, or to
otherwise permit or allow such offender to establish a
residence or be domiciled at his premises, if the prop-
erty is located within an area prohibited by this Chap-
ter.'' 8
The statute mandates that sex offenders in Huntington are restricted
from owning or residing in accessory apartments. 119 To determine
why Huntington targeted sex offenders living in accessory apart-
ments, one must look at the legislative intent of the statute and ex-
amine whether the stated reasons are valid.
A. Accessory Apartments
An accessory apartment is a "self-contained second living
unit that is built into or attached to an existing single-family dwel-
" SUFFOLK COUNTY, N.Y. CODE § 428 (2006).
116 TOWN OF HUNTINGTON CODE § 194-3(A) (2007).
117 Id. § 194-3(A)(1) & (2) (banning sex offenders from day camps and beaches.).
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ling" that functions independently from the dwelling itself.120 Codi-
fied by the Town of Huntington, an accessory apartment is habitable
living space that has a minimum living space of 7500 square feet'21
and a lot frontage of at least seventy-five linear feet.122 The creation
of accessory apartments stemmed from an increase in housing costs
and a decline in household income, which caused extreme difficulty
for low and moderate-income families to find housing.123 "An esti-
mated [twelve] million renter and homeowner households now pay
more then [sic] [fifty] percent of their annual incomes for hous-
ing,""2 and the commonly accepted definition of affordability is for a
household to "pay no more than thirty percent of its annual income
on housing." 25 Additionally, in the second quarter of 2008, the aver-
age sales price for a house in Suffolk County was $445,256, and
$348,444 for a condominium.126 In comparison, in 2008, the average
one-bedroom apartment on Long Island costs $1492 per month.127
The sky-high cost of housing in Suffolk County has forced persons to
choose between "food, clothing, transportation and medical care." 28
These housing prices also indicate that, because of the near-
impossibility of finding affordable housing in Suffolk County, people
have been forced to turn to other means of finding housing-
including finding accessory apartments.129 This includes retired se-
niors who still wish to live independently but cannot afford, or are
not capable of, living on their own anymore. It also includes newly-
120 GROWSMART MAINE, ACCESSORY APARTMENTS: AN AFFORDABLE HOUSING STRATEGY
(2007), http://www.growsmartmaine.org/docs/Affordable-Housing.pdf (last visited Nov. 25,
2009).
121 TOWN OF HUNTINGTON CODE § 198-134(A)(2) (2007).
122 Id. § 198-134(A)(2).
123 Timothy Overton, Empty Laws Make for Empty Stomachs: Hollow Public Housing
Laws in Utah and Other States Force the Nation's Poor to Choose Between Adequate Hous-
ing and Life's Other Necessities, 21 BYU J. PUB. L. 495, 498 (2007) (citing Dep't of Hous.
and Urban Dev., Affordable Hous., http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/affordablehousing/ in-
dex.cfm (last visited July 22, 2009)).
124 Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., supra note 123.
125 id.
126 JONATHAN MILLER, LONG ISLAND/QUEENS MARKET OVERVIEW, http://www.miller sa-
muel.com/reports/pdf-reports/LI-Qu2Q8.pdfL(last visited July 22, 2009).
127 Apartment Ratings.com, New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island Apartment Ren-
tal Rates, http://www.apartmentratings.com/rate?a=MSAAvgRentalPrice&msa=5602 (last
visited July 22, 2009).
128 Overton, supra note 123, at 498 (quoting Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., supra note
123 .
12 GrowSmart Maine, supra 120.
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graduated students who, although starting a new career, cannot afford
to buy a house or rent an apartment because of student loan debt.
Accessory apartments may also be beneficial to sex offenders
who are looking for a place to reside outside of any residency restric-
tion. For example, a sex offender who was just released from prison,
has found employment, and is looking for a fresh start on life may
not have enough money for anything other than an accessory apart-
ment. Perhaps a sex offender has family that lives within the resi-
dency restriction, and although he has little money, wants to remain
in the community in order to maintain contact with his family. In
these cases, accessory apartments may be extremely beneficial for
sex offenders. However, the Town Board of Huntington felt diffe-
rently in passing a statute barring sex offenders from residing in ac-
cessory apartments. 130 In determining the validity of the stated rea-
sons for passing this statute, one must first look at the legislative
intent of the residency restriction. This Comment respectfully sub-
mits that Huntington's legislative action is contrary to the result it
seeks to achieve.
VII. INTENT OF THE ACCESSORY APARTMENT STATUTE
A. Children's Public Safety and Welfare
The first reason the Town Board of Huntington gives for
creating the restriction is the finding that sex offenders "pose a sig-
nificant threat to the health and safety of the community . .. especial-
ly to children."l 3 1 Although it is clear that Huntington's intentions
are noble, it must be asked whether these sex offender restrictions are
more beneficial or detrimental to the health and safety of children.
Before the statute passed, some experts warned that "making it hard-
er for sex offenders to find housing can . . . increase the likelihood
that they will re-offend." 32 If the sex offender is not able to locate
suitable housing, he or she may have fewer treatment options and be
130 TOWN OF HUNTINGTON CODE § 198-133(B)(2) (2007) ("It shall be unlawful for a prop-
erty owner . . . to knowingly or recklessly lease . . . an accessory apartment to a registered
sex offender .... ).
131 Id. § 194-1(A).
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less likely to attend a rehabilitation program.' 3 A sex offender who
fails to complete a treatment program is at a greater risk for both
general and sexual recidivism.13 4
Making it harder for sex offenders to find housing may also
lead to a clustering of sex offenders in Huntington, and, in the ex-
treme, result in homelessness.135 It is not a stretch to state that the
elimination of sex offenders from accessory apartments in Hunting-
ton may lead to a greater concentration of sex offenders in certain
parts of town.' This is exactly what happened in Iowa after their
statute was ruled to be constitutional in Doe v. Miller.3 7 The resi-
dency restriction forced sex offenders to flock to motels and trailer
parks, creating clusters of sex offenders in certain areas.'3 8 One Ce-
dar Rapids motel had twenty-six registered sex offenders living in
twenty-four rooms.139  This clustering of sex offenders may have
dangerous negative consequences for the safety of children.140 Sex-
ual violence can be "normalized," and when sex offenders live to-
gether, they may learn to become "better, more manipulative and
more evasive by learning from other sex offenders' mistakes and
successes."l41
Iowa's residency restriction has caused some sex offenders to
become homeless, causing them to disappear.14 2 When looking at
Iowa's sex offender registry, it may be commonplace for a regi-
strant's address to be listed as " 'on the Raccoon River between Des
Moines and West Des Moines,' 'behind the Target on Euclid,' or
'underneath the 1-80 bridge.' "143 Some sex offenders may even lie
about their residences because of the risk of prosecution or evic-
133 Margaret Troia, Ohio's Sex Offender Residency Restriction Law: Does It Protect the
Health and Safety of the State's Children or Falsely Make People Believe So?, 19 J. L. &
HEALTH 331, 341 (2006).
134 The Ass'n for the Treatment of Sexual Abusers, Facts About Adult Sex Offenders,
http://www.atsa.com/ppOffenderFacts.html (last visited July 22, 2009) [hereinafter ATSA].
13s See Troia, supra note 133, at 341.
136 See id.
'1 Miller 11, 405 F.3d at 700.
138 See Monica Davey, Iowa's Residency Rules Drive Sex Offenders Underground, N.Y.
TIMES, March 15, 2006 at Al.
' Id.
140 Troia,supra note 133, at 333.
141 Richard G. Wright, Sex Offender Post-Incarceration Sanctions: Are There Any Lim-
its?, 34 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 17,43 (2008).
142 Davey, supra note 138, at Al.
143 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 81, at 107.
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tion.'" Law enforcement in Iowa has struggled to maintain track of
sex offenders throughout the state. 145 The Iowa County Attorney's
Association estimates that they cannot account for half of the sex of-
fenders living in Iowa.146 A sheriff for Lynn County, Iowa, stated
that, " '[w]e went from knowing where about [ninety] percent of
them were. We're lucky if we know where [fifty] to [fifty-five] per-
cent of them are now . .. the law created an atmosphere that those in-
dividuals can't find a place to live.' "l47
Although the Town of Huntington is seeking to protect its
children, by banning sex offenders from owning or leasing accessory
apartments, Huntington may be creating an unsafe environment for
children.14 8 Sex offenders that are forced out of Huntington, due to
this statute, will go underground by living in motels or by becoming
homeless. Some sex offenders will be forced to move to other
neighboring towns, potentially creating clusters of them throughout
Suffolk County. Others will lie about their residences to avoid perse-
cutions. The net result of this statute will likely be that law enforce-
ment will struggle to keep track of sex offenders, creating a more
dangerous situation for children living not only in Huntington, but al-
so Suffolk County.
B. High Recidivism Rates of Sex Offenders
According to its legislative intent, Huntington's second rea-
son for passing the residency restriction is the high "rate of recidiv-
ism" for sex offenders.1 49 Many residency restrictions are passed be-
cause of this belief; in fact, federal legislators have stated recidivism
rates of forty, seventy-four, and ninety percent in support of residen-
cy restrictions for sex offenders.15 0 There was no source given for
these figures, nor were the legislators asked for one.'' Noting the
lack of a source for these statistics, it must be asked whether sex of-
fenders actually have a high risk of reoffending. Numerous studies
'" Troia, supra note 133, at 343.
14S HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 81, at 105.
I46 id.
147 Id. (quoting Sea Stachura, The Consequences of Zoning Sex Offenders, MINN. PUB.
RADIO, April 25, 2006, http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2006/ 08/1 0/soundart/).148 See Morris, supra note 132, at A2.
149 TowN OF HUNTINGTON CODE § 194-1(B) (2007).
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have shown that this is not necessarily the case.152 The United States
Department of Justice tracked 272,111 persons released from prison
in 1994-9691 of them were sex offenders.'53 The study found that
sex offenders were less likely to be rearrested for any offense as
compared to non-sex offenders. 15 4 Additionally, out of the 9691 sex
offenders tracked, only 5.3 percent of them were rearrested for a new
sex crime.' 55 The percentage rate for recidivism is slightly higher for
sex offenders that had a prior history of sex offenses.156
Furthermore, New York has implemented three studies on the
recidivism rates of sex offenders, in 1986, 2002, and 2007.'15 In the
first study, the state tracked 556 sex offenders who were released in
1986 over an eight-and-a-half to nine-and-a-half year period, depend-
ing on their release date.'5 8 Although forty-eight percent of sex of-
fenders were arrested for a new offense, only six percent were ar-
rested for a new sex crime.159 The 2002 New York study, which
tracked 12,863 inmates released between 1985-2002, whose most se-
rious offenses included rape, sodomy, sexual abuse, and other sex
crimes, concluded that only two percent of them returned to prison
for another sex offense.160 The 2007 New York study looked at the
proportion of sex offenders rearrested after registering on the sex of-
fender registry.i1t After one year, fifteen percent of sex offenders
were arrested for new crimes, but only two percent were arrested for
new sex offenses.162 After eight years, forty-eight percent of sex of-
152 Id. at 26.
153 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CRIMINAL OFFENDERS
STATISTICS, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm#sex (last visited Nov. 24, 2008).
154 Id. (stating that forty-three percent of sex offenders were arrested for any offense,
while sixty-eight percent of non-sex offenders were rearrested for any offense).
155 Id
156 See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 81, at 26 ("8.3% of all sex offenders with more
than one prior conviction for a sex offense were rearrested for another sex crime.").
1s7 C. David Hess, A Detailed Analysis of Sex Offender Recidivism in New York State,
http://theparson.net/so/recidivismanalysis.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2009).
158 KATHY CANESTRINI, PROFILE AND FOLLOW UP OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED IN 1986 19
(1996), http://www.theparson.net/so/Profile andfollowupof sexoffendersreleased in_
1986.pdf.
19 Id. at 21.
160 LESLIE KELLAM, 2002 RELEASES: THREE YEAR POST RELEASE FOLLOW-UP 16,
http://www.theparson.net/so/2002_Releases_3YROUT.pdf.
16' N.Y. Div. OF PROB. AND CORR. ALTERNATIVES, RESEARCH BULLETIN: SEX OFFENDER
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fenders were arrested for new crimes, but only eight percent of them
committed new sex crimes.163
In addition to New York, low recidivism rates have been
found in studies all around the United States.16 For example, a 2007
Minnesota study found a twelve percent recidivism rate for sex of-
fenders over ten years, with seven percent being re-incarcerated.165
In the same year, a Tennessee study found a 7.6 percent recidivism
rate for sex offenders.166 Other states have also consistently shown
under a ten percent recidivism rate for sex offenders. 6 7
Not only have state studies shown low rates of sex offender
recidivism, but there is no study which suggests that residency re-
striction laws decrease recidivism rates. 1 68 "In fact, the studies [have
shown] that prohibiting sex offenders from residing near schools
does not affect community safety and should not be used to control
recidivism."l 6 9 It is difficult to state that sex offenders are at a high
risk of recidivism when numerous studies conclude exactly the oppo-
site. Furthermore, studies have also shown that residency restrictions
do nothing to deter sex offender recidivism.o It also should be
noted that the Huntington statute, not surprisingly, does not cite to a
source that indicates that "the rate of recidivism is high" for sex of-
163 Id.
16 See, e.g., MINN. DEP'T OF CORR., SEX OFFENDER RECIDIVISM IN MINNESOTA 20 (2007),
http://www.doc.state.mn.us/documents/04-07SexOffenderReport-Recidivism.pdf; TENN.




16s MINN. DEP'T OF CORRECTIONS, supra note 164, at 20 (stating that the average follow up
time was just over eight years, and that follow up periods were between three and sixteen
years.)
166 TENN. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CRIME STATISTICS UNIT, supra note 164, at 8.
167 See, e.g., ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNSEL, CRIMINAL RECIDIVISM IN ALASKA 8 (2007),
http://www.ajc.state.ak.us/reports/1-07CriminalRecidivism.pdf (finding that in a three year
follow up from sex offenders released in 1999, only three percent of sex offenders commit-
ted a new sex offense); OHIO OFFICE OF CRIM. JUST. SERVICES, REPORT TO THE OHIO
CRIMINAL SENTENCING COMMISSION: SEX OFFENDERS 2 (2006), available at
http://www.ocjs.ohio.gov/ResearchlSex%20 Offender0/o20Report%20pdf.pdf (finding an
eight percent recidivism rate from a ten year follow up with sex offenders released in 1989).
168 ATSA, supra note 134.
169 Troia, supra note 133, at 344 (describing two state studies that conclude that a rule
prohibiting where a sex offender resides is irrelevant to preventing sex crimes-"living in
close proximity to schools or parks is not a factor in recidivism").
170 Id. at 344.
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fenders.' 7 ' There is no basis for the high recidivism rates for sex of-
fenders cited within the statute. A substantial majority of studies
have shown a low rate of sex offender recidivism and state that these
types of laws have no effect on reducing recidivism.172 In sum, the
Huntington accessory apartment statute has no basis and will do
nothing to deter the already minimal rate of sex offender recidivism.
C. Failure of Treatment Options
In developing the accessory apartment statute, the Town
Board of Huntington also stated that "programs designed to treat ...
[sex] offenders have been largely ineffective" in reducing recidivism
rates.'73  Early studies, from the 1970s and 1980s, concluded that a
difference in recidivism rates did not exist between sex offenders that
underwent treatment, and those who had not.174  Some recent re-
search has developed similar conclusions.'7 5  However, more recent
studies have concluded that treatment for sex offenders may have a
significant effect in deterring recidivism.176 University of Missouri-
Kansas City law professor John Q. LaFond believes that this discre-
pancy from earlier studies stems from the state's decision that sex of-
fenders "were not sick; they were bad."' 7 7 He notes, however, that
"there [is] an emerging optimism that psychologists can deal with
these people and offer alternatives to continued incarceration."' 7 8
171 TowN OF HUNTINGTON § 194-1(B) (Feb. 6, 2007).
172 ATSA, supra note 134.
173 TowN OF HUNTINGTON CODE § 194-1(B) (Feb. 6, 2007).
174 L. Furby et al., Sex Offender Recidivism: A Review, 105 PSYCH. BULLETIN 3, 3 (1989).
175 Anna Goodnough & Monica Davey, For Sex Offenders, a Dispute Over Therapy's
Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2007, at Al (describing an authoritative California study find-
ing that sex offenders that entered relapse treatment were slightly more likely to offend again
than those who received no therapy at all).
176 Amy Baron-Evans, Still Time to Rethink the Misguided Approach of the Sex Offender
Registration and Notification Act, 20 FED. SEN. R. 357 (2008) (citing several studies which
show that sex offenders that have undergone behavior treatment have lower recidivism rates
than non-treated sex offenders).
17 Karen Kersting, New Hope for Sex Offender Treatment, 34 MONITOR ON PSYCH. 52, 54








A. Is Huntington's Accessory Apartment Statute
Constitutional Under King?
King recognized a fundamental right to intrastate travel and
determined that a statute cannot substantially deter living in a state
within the Second Circuit.179  In order to fully determine whether
Huntington's accessory apartment statute is unconstitutional, one
must look at a map created by Huntington last year. 80 Along with
barring sex offenders from owning or leasing accessory apartments,
Huntington also passed a Child Protection Act,'"' which pinpoints on
a map every school, park, licensed day care center, and playground in
Huntington. The map also shows every accessory apartment in Hun-
tington, and indicates areas inside and outside the quarter-mile buffer
zones. Huntington Town Councilman Stuart Besen stated that
"[n]othing is more important .. . than the safety of our Town's child-
ren," and the map is a "powerful tool" in enforcing the statute.182 The
overall goal of the map is to point out where Level Two and Three
sex offenders may live.' 83
Additionally, this map is also influential in determining the
overall constitutionality of the statute. 184 There are approximately
1700 accessory apartments in Huntington,"' most of them located
within the quarter-mile residency restriction buffer areas.' 86 Of the
1700 accessory apartments, approximately twenty-four percent are
located outside the quarter-mile residency restriction. 187 Considering
179 See King, 442 F.2d at 648.
Iso Town of Huntington, Child Protection Act (Mar. 1, 2008), http://town.huntington.
ny.us/permitpics/644.pdf.
181 id.
182 See Press Release, supra note 5.
183 Morris, supra note 132, at 130.
184 See King, 442 F.2d at 648 (noting a residency requirement penalizes residents only
because they assumed their right to travel). See also Child Protection Act, supra note 180
(portraying several accessory apartments outside the quarter-mile residency restriction in the
Town of Huntington uninhabitable by sex offenders).
185 Morris, supra note 132.
186 See Child Protection Act, supra note 180 (delineating quarter-mile buffer zones in
pink).
187 See id. (indicating that approximately 407 of the 1700 accessory apartments are lo-
cated outside of the residency restriction).
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most of the Town of Huntington is already uninhabitable due to the
quarter-mile residency restriction, the potential ramifications of this
statute are significant for sex offenders. Some of the areas in Hun-
tington that do not have accessory apartments have few or no roads,
which suggest that those areas lack any housing or living space.18
Despite the probable difficulty that a sex offender would encounter in
securing housing, it is feasible that he or she may still do so in Hun-
tington. However, the mere fact that a sex offender is not completely
foreclosed from living in Huntington does not equate to the statute's
constitutionality. The troubling aspect of this statute lies not within
the present difficulty of finding housing, but in the future difficulty of
it. Although sex offenders are unable to reside in over 400 accessory
apartments, it is probable that they could find housing elsewhere in
Huntington.189 However, sex offenders may not be able to live in
Huntington in the future. Each time a homeowner decides to erect an
accessory apartment, it results in one less residence that a sex offend-
er may reside. Due to an exceedingly expensive housing market, not
only are persons unable to afford to buy a house, but homeowners
may look for new means to be able to afford paying off their mort-
gages. One of these means is to create accessory apartments.
A major increase in the amount of accessory apartments in
Huntington will indirectly lead to substantial difficulty for sex of-
fenders to find homes to live in, perhaps leading to a complete im-
pairment of the right to residency. Similar to the New Rochelle pub-
lic housing statute in King, the Huntington statute may indirectly bar
sex offenders from exercising their intrastate right to reside within
the Town.' 90 Since the Second Circuit recognizes an intrastate right
to travel, strict scrutiny must be used in determining the constitutio-
nality of the statute. 191
Huntington believes that its statute is the "most narrowly tai-
lored" means of limiting sex offender contact with children, while
stating that the protection of its residents is a "compelling govern-
188 See id. (delineating open areas in white).
189 See Morris, supra note 132 (noting sex offenders are only banned from renting acces-
sory apartments). See also GrowSmart Maine, supra note 120 (stating that an accessory
apartment is a "self-contained second living unit ... built into or attached to an existing sin-
gle family dwelling").
190 See King, 442 F.2d at 648 (holding that a public housing statute, with a five-year resi-
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mental interest."1 92 Even assuming that the protection of Hunting-
ton's residents is a compelling governmental interest, this statute is
not the most narrowly tailored means of limiting sex offender contact
with children. Although the Huntington Town Board concedes that it
"cannot remove the threat posed to or guarantee the safety of mi-
nors," 93 the statute extends its power too far. As written, the statute
will lead to the indirect banishment of sex offenders residing in Hun-
tington. Laura Ahearn, executive director of Parents for Megan's
Law and the Crime Victims Center in Stony Brook, New York,
agrees with the intention of the statute, but is concerned with its
overbreadth. 194 Ahearn believes towns have to be "very careful [to]
maintain [their] focus and goals on public safety laws and policy so
that they won't compromise existing laws and policies because they
go too far. Because ultimately they will be overturned."l 95
Huntington can accomplish the same legislative intentions by
narrowing the scope of the statute. It is nonsensical that a sex of-
fender cannot rent an accessory apartment outside of the restricted
area, but can rent an apartment in the non-restricted area right next to
a family with three children. Therefore, Huntington can narrowly tai-
lor the statute by prohibiting the lease of accessory apartments to on-
ly those sex offenders who established their residences in the re-
stricted zone after October 31, 2005 (or between 1000 feet and a
quarter-mile of a school, park or playground; 500 feet and a quarter-
mile of a park, beach, or playground before February 6, 2007).196
Sex offenders should be able to rent accessory apartments outside of
the residency restriction. This would accomplish the same govern-
mental purpose by preventing sex offenders from using a manner of
contact within the residency restriction area. It would also allow sex
offenders who want to reside in Huntington, outside of the restricted
area, to do so. As it stands, the statute allows a sex offender to rent
an apartment in a restricted area as long as it is not an accessory
apartment. Thus, the statute does not make any sense, overextends
its authority, and will eventually prevent sex offenders from living in
192 TowN OF HUNTINGTON CODE § 194-1(D) (Feb. 6, 2007).
' Id. § 194-1(E).
194 See Morris, supra note 132, at A2 (noting that Ahearn believes it is "good sense" to
ban sex offenders who own a home from leasing accessory apartments to families, but of-
fenders should be able to rent accessory apartments outside the restricted areas).
195 Id
196 TOWN OF HUNTINGTON CODE § 194-6(A)-(C) (Feb. 6, 2007).
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the town of Huntington.
B. Public Policy
In reviewing the public policy implications, Huntington's re-
sidency restriction and accessory apartment statutes will be analyzed
together because both of them have the same effect. As a matter of
public policy, the Town of Huntington's decision to enact these types
of sex offender statutes is appalling. Although Huntington is well-
intentioned in enacting restrictions against sex offenders, these sta-
tutes will negatively affect the public welfare of children.
The statutes will lead to greater instability for sex offenders.
It is entirely possible that this statute will force sex offenders to move
out of Huntington. But, where will they go? Some sex offenders
will inevitably have to find housing outside of Huntington. There are
two potential problems that may occur because of this. First, sex of-
fenders could potentially be removed from any type of support sys-
tem they may have.'9 7  Moving away from that support system,
whether that consists of families, close friends, relatives, or even
one's employment, will detrimentally affect the psyche of a sex of-
fender, which will increase the chances of re-offense. These support
systems may include a psychotherapy treatment center, such as The
Peterson-Krag Center in Smithtown, which offers adult psychothera-
py and group therapy. 9 8 Although the beneficial effects of medical
treatment for sex offenders are not clear, forcing sex offenders to
move further away from a medical treatment center will increase
their chances of committing another offense.
Huntington's sex offender statute will also indirectly force
sex offenders out of Huntington, leading to sex offender clustering in
other areas of Suffolk County.199 Sex offender clustering has already
occurred in several parts of Long Island. For example, forty-five sex
197 See Troia, supra note 133, at 341 (noting that residency restrictions can force sex of-
fenders to live away from individuals who can provide support systems such as relatives and
immediate family; if sex offenders are forced away from their support system they will be
unable to receive positive support, which has been shown to lead to "fewer criminal and
technical probation violations").
19 The Peterson-Krag Center, Mental Health Services, http://www.pederson-
krag.org/mhs dyn.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2008) (offering "a full array of therapeutic ser-
vices").
199 See Troia, supra note 133, at 341 (indicating that residency laws forced sex offenders
to live in clustered areas "away from treatment options and monitoring systems").
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offenders reside in Coram; seventeen of those individuals reside on
the same block, the highest concentration of sex offenders in Suffolk
County.200 Seventy-six sex offenders live within a five-mile radius in
Mastic.20 1 This type of clustering has already occurred within Hun-
tington itself, as eight of the twenty-two sex offenders reside within
less than a two-mile radius.202 These types of clusters will continue
to develop and build around Suffolk County as an effect of Hunting-
ton's sex offender statute.
It is also likely that Huntington's sex offender policy will
make it harder for the town to track sex offenders. If a sex offender
is unable to find housing, it is not a stretch to assert that the offender
may be rendered homeless, forcing them to go underground. Of the
twenty-two sex offenders living in Huntington, only twelve are in
compliance.203 This means that potentially ten sex offenders who
were tracked by Huntington before the passing of the statute are now
off the radar. Perhaps some of the sex offenders who are in com-
pliance may have given that address only to act in compliance, but
are actually living inside of the residency restriction or elsewhere.
The Town of Huntington may have lost track of almost half of the
sex offenders residing in the area.204 As a result, the statute has had
detrimental effects on public policy, and it has put children at a
greater risk of harm.
It should be noted that Suffolk County has seemingly admit-
ted these types of effects by putting sex offenders in temporary hous-
ing trailers, moving them around the county regularly, and parking
the trailers in non-residential areas for several weeks at a time.205
These offenders are under a strict curfew from 8:00 pm to 7:30 am,
and are given minimal accommodations.206 The purpose of these trai-
200 Jennifer Gonnerman, The House Where They Live, N.Y. MAG., Dec. 30. 2007, availa-
ble at http://nymag.com/news/features/42368/.
201 Corey Kilgannon, Threats of Violence as Homes for Sex Offenders Cluster in Suffolk,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2006, at Bl.
202 See Child Protection Act, supra note 180.
203 id.
204 See Troia, supra note 133, at 343 (suggesting residency restrictions do not lessen the
risk sex offenders pose to children because a sex offender seeking a residence may not regis-
ter his new address with law enforcement to avoid legal repercussions).
205 See Corey Kilgannon, Suffolk County to Keep Sex Offenders on the Move, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 2007, at Bl.
206 Id. (stating that accommodations only consist of a large room, bathroom, and running
water; there is no cooking and no televisions).
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lers is to "motivate the offenders to seek permanent housing."2 07
However, if there is no housing available for sex offenders, this goal
can never be realized. With its sex offender policy, Huntington is
forcing sex offenders to choose between living away from potential
support systems outside of town, going underground, or living in no-
frills trailers. With those options, reoffending and going back to
prison does not seem like a far-fetched alternative.
Not only are Huntington's intentions for protecting the safety
and welfare of children overstated, so are the high recidivism rates
that the Town portrayed in passing this statute.208 In fact, the United
States Department of Justice, and three New York State studies, con-
cluded the exact opposite.209 It is irresponsible of the Town to state
that sex offenders have high recidivism rates when three easily-
accessible state studies have concluded that sex offenders have low
recidivism rates. Passing legislation under the fallacy that sex of-
fenders have high recidivism rates perpetuates the public's unneces-
sary fear and paranoia.210 Such legislation only increases the chances
that a sex offender will commit another sex offense. 2 11 Those high
recidivism rates discussed in Huntington's statutory intent will even-
tually become a self-perpetuating reality.
IX. CONCLUSION
Huntington's sex offender policy is an honest attempt at try-
ing to protect its citizens from sex offenders. The Town Board of
207 id.
20 TOwN OF HUNTINGTON CODE § 194-1(B) (Feb. 6, 2007).
209 See CANESTRINI, supra note 158 (indicating forty-eight percent of sex offenders vi-
olated parole or committed a new offense but only six percent were arrested for new sex
crimes); See also KELLAM, supra note 160 (noting that less than eight percent of 12,863 re-
leased sexual offenders who were "re-committed" were "re-committed" for a new sex
crime); N.Y.S. Div. OF PROB. AND CORR. ALTERNATIVES, RESEARCH BULLETIN: SEX
OFFENDER POPULATIONS, RECIDIVISM AND ACTUARIAL ASSESSMENT 3 (2007),
http://dpca.state.ny.us/pdfs/somgmtbulletinmay2007.pdf (showing only two percent of regis-
tered sex offenders committed a new sex crime out of fifteen percent who committed any
tyEe of new crime within one year of registering as a sexual offender).0o TowN OF HUNTINGTON CODE § 194-1(B) (Feb. 6, 2007) (indicating that the legislative
intent is to reduce the high rate of recidivism, the restrictions would "minimize the risk of
repeated acts").
11 See Troia, supra note 133, at 341 (explaining that restriction laws isolate sex offenders
creating controversy because it has been shown that "sex offenders with positive informed
support systems commit significantly fewer criminal and technical probation violations than
offenders with negative or no support systems").
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Huntington believes that this will improve the public safety and wel-
fare of children.212 Regardless of whether its policy is effective, Hun-
tington's accessory apartment statute is unconstitutional. Consider-
ing that the Second Circuit recognizes the right to intrastate travel,
this statute indirectly violates a sex offenders' constitutional right.213
Since this right is infringed, strict scrutiny applies, and the statute is
not narrowly tailored to meet a compelling governmental interest.
The statute could be modified to accomplish the same purpose with-
out infringing on sex offenders constitutional rights to intrastate tra-
vel. Furthermore, Huntington's sex offender policy is terrible public
policy. It will ultimately do more harm than good to the citizens of
not only Huntington, but all of Suffolk County. Forcing sex offend-
ers out of Huntington will create dangerous clusters of sex offenders
throughout Suffolk County, and leave sex offenders in a realm of un-
certainty. The reasons stated in Huntington's legislative intent are all
refutable. Furthermore, the statute will cause an increase in sex of-
fender recidivism by pushing sex offenders underground and away
from social support structures designed to help sex offenders. This
statute will undoubtedly result in unintended negative consequences,
which neither sex offenders, nor the Town, are ready for.
212 TowN OF HUNTINGTON CODE § 194-1(C) (Feb. 6, 2007).
213 See King, 442 F.2d at 648 (noting that since individuals have a constitutional right to
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